



St. Barbara Enlisted SITREP



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St. Barbara Enlisted SITREP



We appreciate those who have provided announcements, notices, articles and lessons learned.

Additionally, if you have a story of interest or wish to initiate a discussion on any topic or issue please contact:

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!!KING OF BATTLE!!

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REDLEG 7 SENDS

It's been a year of progress and change across the Branch. This will be the final ST Barbara Enlisted SITREP for FY21. I want to personally thank all who contributed to ensure we are flattening communication across the Field Artillery.

If there is content of interest out there we are not covering, feel free to tell me directly. This edition has several important enclosures: *DA PAM 600-25* updates to all Enlisted Career Maps, Fires Conference 2021 schedule and virtual log in information, Credentialing Updates, the Esteemed Order of Molly Pitcher criteria, and as always awesome observations from our CTCs. Over the next Quarter what you should expect to see:

1. Project Athena: Fort Sill NCOA will host Subject Matter Experts from NCOLCoE as they conduct/instruct an eight-hour coaching train-the-trainer for BLC, ALC, & SLC instructors. We are on glide path to incorporate Project Athena across all PME course beginning in October 2021. We are messaging to the force to become familiar with the program <https://capl.army.mil/athena/#/>

2. FA Master Gunner Redesign: Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) handed off the proposed 5 week Program of Instruction to the FAMG Division for validation and edits. Upon completion, we will send it to Operational Unit leaders for comments and adjudication. Courseware, simulations, and connectivity are all on track to run pilot program in FY22-assuming the Course Growth Request is approved and supported by Senior Leaders this fall.

3. FA Pre-Command Course Redesign: In preparation for the FY22 CAC mandated one week Branch PCC, we ran our last FY21 course (26-30 July) as a pilot to allow for adjustments. Notable changes include- Incorporate Tests/Assessments- Assess students' ability to fight (technical and tactical competence), develops FA Specific IDP to correct knowledge gaps, and link assessments with leader developmental resources. CSM selects will continue to be invited to attend!

4. Due to budget constraints, there were discussions to potentially remove some functional courses across some if not all Branches. Savings were found elsewhere, Units and Leaders can expect that all of our Branch Functional Courses (JFO, U6, JOFEC, FSV-MEP, etc.) will be fully funded at least through the end of FY23.

We are humbled to serve you and our Field Artillery community. We look forward to another year of progress, leader development, and driving change.

GUNS UP AND KING OF BATTLE!

Redleg 7
CSM Michael J. McMurdy

DA PAM 600-25

The Field Artillery develops NCOs who are uniquely qualified to support Army and Joint Forces Commanders. In order to provide the best product to ensure that NCOs are equipped with the knowledge on what they need to progress in their career, a determination was made that updates and revisions needed to be made to key sections in DA PAM 600-25. These changes were designed to bring clarity to the document, which will help guide CMF 13 Soldiers throughout the Field Artillery.

One of the most important changes that was made, was the addition of Chapter 4. This is important because the chapter defines what key development is for each respective grade, and clarifies “credit” served in KD billets at the next higher level. In addition, across CMF 13 Soldiers SSGs, SFC, and MSG/1SG KD timelines should be served for a minimum of 24 months to be considered fully qualified.

Some other key changes that were made, was the change from APFT to ACFT, ERB to SRB, and special assignments to reflect current requirements in operation billets. In keeping with Army changes, the statement “SSGs who have successfully completed a minimum of 12 months of Section Chief time, and 12 months in a broadening assignment should be considered fully qualified for promotion to the next higher grade” was removed. This was removed due to the new 48 month time in grade requirement, and the ability for a SSG to obtain the minimum 24 months of Key Development time prior to the SFC board.

Each CMF 13 MOS is unique in their own way, and changes are made to better improve the state of the Field Artillery as a whole. The changes below were made to the following MOS:

-13B

- * Staff Sergeant: Those NCO’s that qualify to serve in positions of trust should be considered highly competitive.
- * Sergeant First Class: Successful Performance as a Battalion Master Gunner or the next higher level is seen as above peers.

-13F

- * Staff Sergeant: Updated special assignments and available schools

- * Sergeant First Class: Updated special assignments and available schools

- 13J

- * Staff Sergeant: Clarification of key development billet for SSG being a platoon/battery level Fire Control NCO.
- * Sergeant First Class: Clarified key development billet is the Battalion level Senior Fire Control NCO and Battery Operations Sergeant.

-13M

- * Staff Sergeant: Special assignments updated KD time and added favorable Master Gunner and position of trust performance.
- * Sergeant First Class: Special assignments updated KD time and added favorable Master Gunner and position of trust performance.
- * Staff Sergeant: Added civilian education to self-development
- * Sergeant First Class: Added civilian education to self-development
- * Staff Sergeant: Courses were added and deleted to additional training
- * Sergeant First Class: Courses were added and deleted to additional training

- 13R

- * Staff Sergeant: Updated duty title from Senior Radar Operator to Radar Team Chief.
- * Sergeant First Class: Updated duty title from SR FA Targeting NCO to Counter fire NCO.

The Field Artillery Proponent Office will continue to evaluate the growth of the CMF 13, and ensure that the branch stays well balanced as we gear towards the future. Field Artillery Soldiers are encouraged to contact their respective career managers if they have any questions or concerns in regards to their professional development. The latest version of DA PAM 600-25 is located on milSuite at <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/smartbook-da-pam-600-25>.

The ARMY COOL Program

By SFC Nicholas Faurot

From Professional Red Legs to Certified Information Security Managers. The ARMY COOL Program.

Field Artillery Soldiers can now seek education advancement outside of the normal college degree programs. The ARMY Credentialing Opportunities On-Line (COOL) helps FA Soldiers advanced not only their Military Career but their personal education by offering TA approved credentialing opportunities. These credentials offer Soldiers a plethora of options that fit many of their interests.


The selling feature of the ARMY COOL Program, it is free for Soldiers that elect to use the ARMY tuition assistance. The ARMY COOL Website (<https://www.cool.osd.mil/army/index.htm>) is an easy to navigate website that lists available credentials by MOS, Management, and Common Core. For Artillery

Soldiers there are 34 credentials for 13F, 30 for 13B, 51 for 13J, 42 for 13M, 16 for 13R and 11 for 13Z.

There are also 31 Management and 43 Common Core credentials offered for all Soldiers. The available courses range from Apple Certified Tech to Certified Athletic Trainer.

The Field Artillery Proponent Office (FAPO) team is tasked with reviewing the credentials for each MOS and recommending additional credentials that relate to each MOS. With each credential, career managers have to evaluate at what skill level the credential should be sought after as well as whether or not the credential should have promotion points awarded. Soldiers are encouraged to contact their respective career manager if they have any questions or comments on the ARMY COOL program.

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Knox, Hamilton, and Gruber Awards

by SFC Zachary S. Wilkerson

The Field Artillery Awards Program is

one of the most important branch sustainment programs in the Field Artillery. The Field Artillery Awards Program is essential to sustaining the pride, professionalism, and esprit de corps of the branch as the program rewards and recognizes unit, and individual excellence. The Knox, Hamilton, and Grueber Awards, are such awards that exemplify those deemed to be identified as the best units and individual in the Field Artillery.

Henry A. Knox Award

The Henry A. Knox award is named after the first Chief of Artillery, and first Secretary of War, Major General Henry A. Knox. The award recognizes the most outstanding active component battery. Originally called the Knox Trophy and metal, the award was established in 1924 by Chief of the Field Artillery and presented annually.

The trophy recognized the best artillery battery and the Medal recognized the best enlisted Artillery Soldiers. Before World War II, the awards were not presented. In 2002, the Knox Trophy was reinstated and the Medal was replaced with the Gruber Award to recognize individual Soldiers.

This year's Henry A. Knox Award, was awarded to Bravo Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment. In August of 2020, Bravo Battery was hand selected by the Brigade Commander to serve as the 17th Field Artillery Brigade's short-notice expeditionary strike package.

In coordination with the 62nd Air Wing's C-17 Air Lift Command, Bravo Battery flawlessly completed a highly complex Joint Forcible Entry Operation (JFEO) HIRAN mission into Shemya, Alaska, along the Aleutian Island Chain. While forward deployed, over 2,700 miles away from home stations, the battery was able to validate the communications architecture utilizing un-tested Upper TI systems and provide valuable feedback to both 17th FAB, and the 1st Multi-



Domain task Force (MDTF). This mission showcased the strategic implications of the HIMARS ability to provide operational and strategic fires throughout the INDO-PACOM AOR.

Alexander Hamilton Award

The Alexander Hamilton Award recognizes the best Army National Guard (ARNG) Battery. It was created in 2002 and is named after American Statesman and Continental Army Artilleryman Alexander Hamilton. Alexander Hamilton was an outstanding artillery battery commander, and a skilled cohort of General George Washington during the Revolutionary War. Hamilton helped frame the U.S. Constitution, and served as the nation's first Secretary of Treasury. This year's Hamilton Award, was awarded to Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 258th Field Artillery Regiment, NY ARNG.

Prior to and during their COVID-19 related mobilizations in New York City, the epicenter of the pandemic, Alpha battery's Soldiers consistently made the mission happen. Whether distributing millions of meals to vulnerable New York City residents or help-

Continued on Page 7, See KHG Awards

KHG Awards ...continued from Page 6

ing to administer thousands of COVID-19 tests, Alpha battery finished TY20 with a record of outstanding accomplishments. Despite the pandemic's challenges and the associated personnel shortages, Alpha battery made the most of its training time during TY20, laying the foundations for future success. In preparation for a deployment to Australia.

Alpha battery completed its pre-deployment tasks. Although the pandemic ultimately resulted in the deployment's cancellations, the battery's multiple mobilizations during TY20 involved many activities consistent with overseas deployments.

Edmund L. Gruber Award

The Edmund L. Gruber Award is named after Brigadier General Edmund L. Gruber, a noted Field Artillery Officer, who as a First Lieutenant in 1908 composed the "Caisson Song" which the Army adapted as "The Army Song" in 1952. The Gruber Award was established in 2002 to recognize individual Field Artillery Soldiers for innovations that resulted in significant contributions to enhance the Field Artillery's war fighting capabilities, morale, readiness, and maintenance.

This year's Gruber Award, was awarded to CPT Marissa Battinieri, 5th Battalion, 3th Field Artillery Regiment, 17th Field Artillery Brigade. Upon her arrival to 17th FAB, CPT Battinieri, was

immediately recognized for her planning acumen and forward thinking, and was selected to lay the groundwork to welcome the Army's first Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) to the operational force at Joint Base Lewis McChord.


She personally interfaces with numerous external agencies including Army Futures Command, and the U.S. Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, in order to ensure a smooth stand up and path to initial operational capability for the weapon system. Her ability to capture innovations in developing capabilities has pulled together the key elements of the SFB. Determining key manning equipment and infrastructure issues related to the SFB, has kept the BN, BOE, JBLM, and the Army on course with our peer threats.

As the Force Modernization Officer for the 17th FAB, CPT Battinieri also spearheaded the brigade's reviews of both ATP 3-09.24 (The Field Artillery Brigade), and ATP 3-09.12 (Field Artillery Counter fire and Weapons Locations Radar Operations). CPT Battinieri's unmatched intellectual understanding and strong doctrinal foundation enabled her and her team to compile over 50 recommendations for updates and changes to the doctrine. After conducting each doctrinal review, CPT Battinieri reviewed internal brigade processes in the 17th FAB Red Book and TACSOP to ensure all best practices and updates were captured in relevant brigade products.

Army IgnitED: <https://www.armyignited.com/app/>

Army Cool: <https://www.cool.osd.mil/army/index.htm>

TA ETP: <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-959826>



FIRES CDID

Army Capabilities Manager Field Artillery-DIVARTY

Call to Inform:

Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is the Army's concept for fighting wars in 2028 and beyond. This concept will require developing systems and capabilities that will fill identified capability gaps within the Joint Services. Army Capability Manager Field Artillery Brigade-DIVARTY (ACM FAB-D) is working with Strategic and Operational Rockets and Missiles (STORM) Project Office and industry to develop more effective munitions and upgrade current systems in an ongoing effort to ensure future MLRS, HIMARS, MFOM, and RADAR are prepared and combat effective in future large scale combat operations.

ACM FAB-D is currently working on getting HIMARS Maritime software added to the launcher fire control system software suite to enable the capability of firing all current and future (PrSM,ERG) MFOM from a ship. A request from all active-duty HIMARS units and the requirement to fill Gaps in Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) Study 2 and 3 are some reasons ACM FAB-D is pursuing the capability. The Marines successfully tested a legacy capability in 2017 when they fired a HIMARS from the USS Anchorage, however; they never added the capability to the final software build.

Additionally, that software version only allowed GMLRS to be fired. This software is an important capability to the military and its ability to compete in the INDOPACOM AOR. ACM FAB-D will continue to work with PM STORM to get the software added to future builds. A PM STORM team also is currently supporting a maritime software install to the MDTF for Defender PACIFC 21. We are working with the science and technology DEVCOM department to request a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) next year of this capability.

Next, the development of the ER-GMLRS is an effort ACM FAB-D is working to extend the range of GMLRS to 135+ kilometers and incorporate an enhanced buckshot warhead that will allow the engagement of light to medium armored targets. The ability to engage targets with rockets between ranges 80-135+

kilometers is a capability gap that was identified in the past years. This year the ER- GMLRS demonstrated two successful test flights by going out to 80-kilometer and 135-kilometers on multiple occasions. ER-GMLRS will help provide a lower cost per kill solution per engagement by using a lower cost munition (ER-GMLRS) vs using an ATACMS or even Precision Strike Missile (PrSM).

ACM FAB-D continues its efforts to increase the number of Rigid Wall Shelter (RWS) authorizations on the MTOE as well as resourcing a replacement for the current shelter. This increase in MTOE will bring back the authorization of the Battery Operation Center (BOC) and the S2/S3 Current Operations (CUOPS). The current Rigid Wall Shelter is no longer a program of record which presents challenges of sustainability and maintainability across the force, which hinders readiness. The rigid wall shelter provides HIMARS units command and control at both Battery and Platoon levels. A loss in RWS sustainability has led some units to refitting other vehicles in an attempt to meet their RWS requirements.

Unfortunately, their efforts are not always as effective as a dedicated shelter designed for C2 operations. An increase in MTOE will help drive a requirement for a new RWS solution and provide units with the equipment they will require once they convert to 3x9.

Lastly, ACM FAB-D is in the process of rebuilding their website to provide the force a place to get updated doctrine, TTPs, safety bulletins and other information related to MLRS, HIMARS, MFOM, and RADARS.

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FIRES CDID

Army Capabilities Manager Fires Cells-Targeting

Call to Inform:

ACM Fires Cells-Targeting, representing the Commanding General (CG), TRADOC acts as TRADOC's centralized manager for all user activities associated with Fire Support; is responsible for using the integrating framework of the Army warfighting challenges to integrate, synchronize, and coordinate efforts across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P); coordinates with Army, joint, and international partners and/or agencies to ensure key areas remain integrated and support operational requirements; is the user advocate for Fire Support Command, Control and Communications system software applications, software applications in support of targeting, and Fire Support Sensor Systems, both mounted and dismounted.

Branches:

1. Fire Support Branch: Responsible for Fire Support Targeting Sensors, Fire Support Software, and Fire Support Vehicles at Company/Troop and below. Within our portfolio is dismounted Sensors (Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS)/Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR)), Mounted Sensors (Fire Support Sensor System (FS3)) and Vehicles (M1200/Stryker FSV/BFIST) and Fire Support Software (Pocket Size Forward Entry Device (PFED)/ Precision Fires-Dismounted (PF-D)/ Precision Fires-Mounted (PF-M)/Forward Observer Software (FOS)) Also, provides assistance for Fire Support Element at Battalion and higher.

2. Interoperability Branch: Responsible for providing a broad spectrum of network services for multiple commodity areas including communications and electronic equipment, automated information systems, computer systems, tactical network operations systems and vehicular systems. Represents, manages and coordinates total ACM user requirements and overall

planning, coordinating, and managing the Network and net-centric equipment/systems and interoperability requirements. Represents the USA in Multi-national interoperability programs including Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities (ASCA) and America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (ABCANZ).

3. Fires C2 Integration Branch: Responsible for Command and Control (C2) systems from Platoon to Echelons above Brigade (EAB). Programs within the C2 branch include the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical data System (AFATDS), Joint Automated Deep operations Coordination System (JADOCS), Centaur and the Meteorological system Profiler Virtual Modeler (PVM). Responsible for managing ACM requirements, publishing, and posting the current Joint Master Unit List (JMUL). Work being done in the branch: Developing a requirements document for a joint targeting C2 replacement software capability for currently fielded JADOCS. The Joint Targeting Command and Control System (JTC2S) has already garnered the attention of LRPF CFT and Army Futures Command leadership. AFATDS 7.0 development will be the next version of Fires C2 software. The version is in development with the vendor and will allow for more streamlined user interface, enhanced training capabilities and encompass LRPF platform/munition capabilities for the near future.

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Fires CDID

New Equipment Training and Integration Team (NET-IT)

3204 Courage Loop
Fort Sill, OK 73503

Team Chief/Chief Instructor: MSG John P. Moore
john.p.moore2.mil@mail.mil Operations Officer: Mr.
Jeffrey A. Morpew jeffrey.a.morpew.civ@mail.mil

Call to inform

The New Equipment Training and Integration Team's mission is to develop, coordinate, plan, and execute doctrine and tactics training strategies for all new and displaced Field Artillery lethal and non-lethal systems. We provide support and USAFCoE oversight for New Equipment Training and Displaced Equipment Training, as well as provide subject matter experts to support ACMs (Army Capability Managers) and DOTD (Directorate of Training and Doctrine) for FA combat system development, testing and fielding. NET-IT also provides guidance to commanders, leaders, staffs, and crews/operators on how to employ the combat capabilities of new or improved equipment, along with augmenting PM's (Project Managers) NET Teams.

During system development, instructors attend Initial Users Tests and Limited Users Tests, write/review and other developmental stage support in order to gain subject matter expert knowledge. They also instruct "player" personnel for Instructor and Key Personnel Training. Pre-NET, the team reviews and provides input to the Training Support Packages (TSP's), including Programs of Instruction (POI), Lesson Plans, Instructor/Student Guides and instructor slides for DTT (Doctrine, Tactics, and Training) and NET, as well as plan for New Material In-Briefs and Initial Planning Reviews. During the NET, instructors serve as the New Equipment Trainers, conduct DTT/TTP briefs and leaders training, and provide oversight/

liaison in coordination with civilian instruction, all in the effort of training SME's for the supported units. Post-NET, the teams will validate the TSP's, support testing of new materials/systems and upgrades with SME's, and support reset if required.

NET-IT's main initiatives are currently providing support for the fielding and training of the M109A7 Family of Vehicles (13B support), Precision Guidance Kits (PGK) and Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiatives (APMI) training and live-fires (13F and 13J support), and fielding and training of the Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System with GPS (IPADS-G) (13R support). We also provide additional support/training for these systems and MOS's, and are currently scheduled to execute several testing and SME feedback events for new systems and equipment. NET-IT is always looking for motivated, KD-complete NCO's (13B, 13F, 13J, and 13R) to join the team and help train units and Soldiers across the force.

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From EPMD, HRC

CONSOLIDATED ACTIVE COMPONENT ENLISTED STABILIZATION PROCEDURES

STABILIZATION LEVERS:

Command teams (commanders and CSMs) and S1/G1s with a single common operating picture of stabilization levers available to manage turbulence and preserve readiness whether missioned for a combat deployment or rotation, scheduled for the CTC/MRE or are remaining in garrison/home station. These stabilization levers policies and procedures are provided at www.hrc.army.mil/content/15154 (<http://www.hrc.army.mil/content/15154>).

MISSION DEFINITIONS:

COMBAT DEPLOYMENTS: Units that deploy to named operational deployments to imminent danger/ hostile fire areas.

ROTATIONAL: Units allocated to combatant command for the purpose of executing a mission that requires all or part of the unit to be away from home station for nine months or more to areas not eligible for hostile fire or imminent danger pay.

CTC/MRE: Conus units scheduled for a combat training center (CTC) or deploying ADA (Patriot) units scheduled for a mission readiness exercise (MRE).

GARRISON/ROUTINE: Units not missioned with an imminent combat deployment, rotation or CTC.

STABILIZATION LEVERS AVAILABLE FOR COMBAT DEPLOYMENTS AND ROTATIONS: (CLICK ON THE LEVER TITLE LINK TO VIEW DETAILED PROCEDURES)

STOP MOVE (SM): <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/20815>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/20815>)

1. Requesting Authority: ACOM/ASCC.
2. Stabilizes select or all Soldiers 6 months prior to latest arrival date (LAD) (does not apply to Soldiers on assignment instructions). SM is effective 180 days prior to the unit's LAD and continues through redeployment + 90-days.

CREW STABILIZATION (FOR UNITS WITH LAD): <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19793>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19793>)

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CREW STABILIZATION (FOR UNITS WITH LAD): <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19793>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19793>)

25. The number of stabilized Soldiers will not exceed the number of KD positions authorized by the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE).

MASTER GUNNERS: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19802>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19802>)

1. Requesting authority: Auto stabilization by HRC upon course graduation, all others brigade commander.
2. Master Gunner stabilization provides increased readiness and lethality in U.S. Army Forces Command (fFORSCOM) by stabilizing Master Gunner qualified Soldiers, not already on assignment instructions (AI), for a period of 18 months upon completion of the Master Gunner Course or to allow the Master Gunners to complete an 18 month tour as a Master Gunner.
3. Master Gunner stabilization is applicable to additional skill identifiers (ASI): A7 - Feld Artillery Master Gunner, A8 - Master Gunner M1/M1A1 Tank, J3 - Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Master Gunner, K8 - Master Gunner M1A2 Tank, and R8 - Mobile Gun System Master Gunner.

RANGER GRADUATE STABILIZATION: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/22398>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/22398>)

1. Requesting authority: Auto stabilization by HRC upon course graduation.
2. Ranger graduate stabilization is applicable to active Army enlisted Soldiers in CMFs 11, 13, 14 and 19 that graduate the U.S. Army Ranger Course and earn the special qualification identifier (SQI) G-Ranger or V-Ranger Parachutist.
3. Eligible Soldiers, not already on assignment instructions, are automatically stabilized by HRC for 12 months following U.S. Ranger course graduation. Units are encouraged to keep HRC Career Branches informed of their intent to send a Soldier to the U.S. Army ranger course to reduce the likelihood that the soldier will be placed on AI while waiting to attend the course.

SPECIAL CATEGORY: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19811>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19811>)

1. Requesting authority: Brigade commander.
2. Stabilizes individual Soldiers serving in specific duty positions; e.g., First Sergeants, Battle Staff, Instructors, Observer/Controllers at CTCs, etc. Stabilization requests will not be considered for soldiers who are already on assignment instructions.

ORGANIZATIONAL STABILIZATION: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19810>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19810>)

1. Requesting authority: Battalion commander.
2. Stabilizes Soldiers in organizations where each Soldier assigned to the organization is authorized

a period of stabilization upon arrival e.g., Old Guard, MEPS and White House.

CRITICAL ENLISTED AVIATION SKILLS/POSITIONS: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/21162>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/21162>)

1. Requesting authority: Brigade commander.
2. Increased readiness in U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) by stabilizing critical enlisted aviation skills/positions for up to 24 months upon completion of an ASI granting course or assignment to a specified position within a unit's manning document and not already on assignment instructions.
3. Critical enlisted aviation skills/positions stabilization is applicable to the following additional skill identifiers (ASI) and duty positions: U7 – UAS Instructor Operator, N1 – Nonrated Crewmember Flight Instructor (FI)/Standardization Flight Instructor (SI), Brigade Standardization NCO, and Technical Inspector.

HIGH SCHOOL SENIOR STABILIZATION: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/10934>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/10934>)

1. Requesting authority: Commanders.
2. The intent of the procedure is to provide stability to Soldiers with Family members in their **junior and senior years** of high school. The Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (EPMD) will, to the maximum extent possible, approve stabilization requests and should not place Soldiers on assignment with report dates prior to the stabilization termination date.

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STABILIZATIONS: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19807>
(<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19807>)

1. Requesting authority: Battalion/brigade commanders.
2. This process prevents the reassignment of Soldiers who may require continued care and treatment from a trained Behavioral Health Professional. Soldiers requiring a referral for a Command Directed Behavioral Health Evaluation (CDBHE), or undergoing follow-on treatment from a BHE will be stabilized at their current unit and be identified as medically non-available for permanent change of station (PCS) and deployment until properly cleared by a Behavioral Healthcare Provider (BHP).

DELETIONS/DEFERMENTS: (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19808>)
<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19808> (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19808>)

1. Requesting Authority: Brigade Commander and entered in the FF Screen in EDAS.
2. Deletes or defers Soldiers on assignment instructions.

The following are regulations for which EPMD is the proponent:

AR 600-8-11, Reassignment
 Contact: (502) 613-5852(DSN: 983-5852)
 Office Symbol: AHRC-EPO-P

AR 612-201, Initial Entry/Prior Service Trainee Support
 Contact: (502) 613-5852(DSN: 983-5852)
 Office Symbol: AHRC-EPO-P

AR 614-200, Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management
 Contact: (502) 613-5852(DSN: 983-5852)
 Office Symbol: AHRC-EPO-P

AR 600-4, Remission or Cancellation of Indebtedness
 Contact: (502) 613-5852(DSN: 983-5852)
 Office Symbol: AHRC-EPO-P

Visit APD (<https://armypubs.army.mil/> (<https://armypubs.army.mil/>)) for all online regulations.

Soldier Actions Team

Deletions, Deferments and Early Arrivals

- Deletion, Deferment, and Rejection Codes <https://www.hrc.army.mil/asset/17014>
 (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/asset/17014>)
- Guidance for Processing Deletions, Deferments and Failure Lose/Gain Soldiers
<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/16870> (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/16870>)
- Report Time and Early Arrival during Reassignment <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19809>
 (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19809>)

Assignment Eligibility and Availability (AEA) Information <https://www.hrc.army.mil/asset/18434>
 (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/asset/18434>)

Medical Protection System (MEDPROS) <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19813>
 (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/19813>)

Enlisted Procedures Team

Permissive Joint Domicile Assignments <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/28>
 (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/28>)

Homebase Advanced Assignment Program (HAAP) <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/10937>
 (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/10937>)

Married Army Couple Program (MACP) <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/5432>
 (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/5432>)



Fires Conference 2021 Agenda

★ Presenting Remotely



Tuesday 31 AUG 21		Wednesday 1 SEP 21		Thursday 2 SEP 21	
30 August: Great Teammates Golf Scramble	0900-0920: CG Opening Comments (MG Kamper)	<u>FA Breakout</u>		<u>ADA Breakout</u>	
	0930-1015: Air and Missile Defense Cross Functional Team Update (BG/P Gibson)	0900-0930: Waypoint 2028 Update (COL Karlberg) ★		0900-0915: Opening Remarks	
	1030-1100: Air Defense Artillery Commandant Update (BG Harrison)	0945-1015: Multi-Domain Task Force (MAJ Blane) ★		0915-0945: OCADA Update	
	1115-1145: Field Artillery Commandant Update (BG Preston)	1030-1130: USAREUR-AF Update (GEN Cavoli) ★		0950-1020 : CSM Update (CSM Gray)	
				0900-1000: Nagorno-Karabakh UAS and CUAS (COL/R Antal)	
				<u>FA Breakouts</u>	
				1010-1100: FA SLD (COL Sadusky) ★	
				1115-1200: FA OPMD (LTC Walker) ★	
				<u>ADA Breakouts</u>	
				1010-1050: ACM AAMDC Update (COL Chidester)	
				1110-1150: ACM ADA BDE Update (COL Schulke)	
	1300-1400: SMA Grinston ★	1330-1430: DA G-3/5/7 Update (LTG Rainey) ★		<u>FA Breakouts</u>	
	1415-1500: SMDC Update (LTG Karbler) ★	1445-1545: Space Update (GEN Dickinson)		1300-1400: ARNG FA Update (BG Grenon)	
	1515-1600: Long Range Precision Fires Cross Functional Team Update (BG/P Rafferty)	<u>FA Breakouts</u>		1415-1515: FA CSM and CWOB Breakouts (CSM McMurdy, CW5 Pressley)	
	1615-1700: Lifecycle Support to the MDO-enabled Fires Force (MG Royar)	1600-1700: AMTC Update (COL Lee)		1530-1600: FA CMTD Closing Comments	
		<u>ADA Breakouts</u>		<u>ADA Breakouts</u>	
		1600-1620: ADA OPMD ★		1300-1330: 10 th AAMDC Update ★	
		1620-1640: ADA SLD ★		1330-1400: 263d AAMDC Update ★	
		1640-1700: ADA EPMD ★		1400-1420 (20min) BREAK ★	
				1420-1450: 32d AAMDC Update ★	
				1450-1520: 94 th AAMDC Update ★	
				1520-1540: ADA CMTD Closing Comments	
		1730: Tattoo Ceremony in honor of Lt Gen Joseph Weber (invite only)		1730: AUSA FCoE and AFC Reception and Care Providers Banquet (Invite Only)	

As of 18 1830 AUG 21

FRONT



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1
300 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0300

DAPE-PRP (611-1a)

20 May 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Notification of Future Change to DA PAM 611-21, E-2110-10, Establishment of Professional Development Proficiency Code (PDPC) Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) 6H (Minimum MOS Qualified (MMQ) Staff Sergeant), 7H (Minimum MOS Qualified Sergeant First Class) and 8H (Minimum MOS Qualified Master Sergeant)

1. PURPOSE. Provide Notification of Future Changes to the Military Occupational Classification and Structure for implementation.
2. COORDINATION. This change (enclosure 1) has been coordinated with affected HQDA principal staff agencies per AR 25-30 and AR 611-1 for publication in the next electronic update of DA PAM 611-21 (Smartbook/milSuite).
3. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
 - a. Establish PDPC ASI 6H for association with Career Management Field (CMF) 11 (Infantry), 13 (Field Artillery) and 19 (Armor) to identify NCOs that have completed the MMQ at the SSG level (e.g. Squad Leader, Section Sergeant, etc.). Identification of these NCOs allows for support of Career Management Field (CMF) and Army broadening assignments without knowingly disadvantaging NCOs who have not met the minimum time in professional developing positions established by each CMF Proponent.
 - b. Establish PDPC ASI 7H for association with CMF 11, 13 and 19 to identify NCOs that have completed the MMQ at the SFC level (e.g. Platoon Sergeant, etc.). Identification of these NCOs allows for support of CMF and Army broadening assignments without knowingly disadvantaging NCOs who have not met the minimum time in professional developing positions established by each CMF Proponent.
 - c. Establish PDPC ASI 8H for association with CMF 11, 13 and 19 to identify NCOs that have completed the MMQ at the MSG level (e.g. 1SG, Detachment Sergeant, Senior Enlisted Advisor, etc.). Identification of these NCOs allows for support of CMF and Army broadening assignments without knowingly disadvantaging NCOs who have not met the minimum time in professional developing positions established by each CMF Proponent.
4. IMPLEMENTATION.

DAPE-PRP (611-1a)

SUBJECT: Notification of Future Change to DA PAM 611-21, E-2110-10, Establishment of Professional Development Proficiency Code (PDPC) Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) 6H (Minimum MOS Qualified Staff Sergeant), 7H (Minimum MOS Qualified Sergeant First Class) and 8H (Minimum MOS Qualified Master Sergeant)

- a. Training strategy. Not applicable.
- b. Position recoding. Not applicable.
- c. Personnel reclassification.

(1) The effective date for establishment of PDPC ASI Codes 6H, 7H and 8H for award in personnel reclassification is 1 July 2021.

(2) Specific personnel reclassification guidance is at enclosure 2.

(3) The reclassification of personnel for establishment of PDPC ASI Code 6H, 7H and 8H may be accomplished during the 1 June – 30 September 2023 Reclassification Management of Change Window. Effective date of establishment of PDPC ASI Code 6H, 7H and 8H is 1 July 2021.

- d. Supporting documents. Not applicable.
- e. Personnel Substitutability. Not applicable.

f. Milestones (AR 611-1, table 3-1). The following milestones require to update manpower and personnel systems will occur after release of NOFC.

(1) 31 October 2021 – Close MOCS window and consolidate approved changes (ODCS G-1).

(2) 30 November 2021 – Update POSC – Edit File (ODCS G-1).

(3) 30 November 2021 – Forward TOE POSC – Edit Export File to USAFMSA G3 for the FY24 FMS Planning Filter.

SSG Webster Anderson, Congressional Medal of Honor Recipient

SSG Webster Anderson received the Congressional Medal of Honor (MoH) for his demonstrated gallantry while serving with Battery A, 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Infantry Division (Airmobile) in Vietnam. His intrepidity in action, personal sacrifice, and commitment to his fellow Soldiers remains an inspiration to this day.

SSG Anderson's heroics saved both Battery A's position and untold numbers of other Soldiers' lives. Early on 15 October 1967, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) infantry, employing heavy mortars, recoilless rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades, assaulted Battery A's position at its fire support base (FSB) near Tam Ky in central Vietnam. The NVA forces breached the FSB's defensive perimeter and charged toward Battery A's gun pit.

SSG Anderson, "with complete disregard for his personal safety," according to his MoH citation, mounted the exposed parapet of his position and rallied the defense. He directed howitzer fire on the advancing NVA troops, and he provided rifle and grenade fire against the enemy soldiers who attempted to overrun his gun section's position. Anderson quickly became the focus of enemy small arms and grenade fire: two grenades exploded at his feet, knocked him over, and severely wounded him in both legs. Medical personnel later amputated both of them. Despite being unable to stand, SSG Anderson pulled himself onto the parapet, from which he continued to direct howitzer fire and encourage the Soldiers near him to fight.

An enemy grenade then landed in the gun pit, near a wounded member of Anderson's gun crew. Anderson, "heedless of his own safety," grabbed the grenade and threw it over the parapet. The grenade exploded almost immediately after he released it, which grievously wounded him on his arm. Like his legs, surgeons amputated part of his arm to



SSG Webster Anderson, U.S. Army photo

save his life. Although only partially conscious and in excruciating pain, Anderson refused medical evacuation so other Soldiers could receive treatment before him.

Despite losing both his legs and part of his arm, Anderson survived and returned home. The Army promoted him to SFC upon his medical retirement in 1968, and Congress, on behalf of a grateful nation, awarded him the MoH. Anderson's MoH citation rightly reads that his "extraordinary heroism at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty are in the highest traditions of the military service." Anderson lived to age 70, until 2003, and he is buried in the Blackjack Baptist Church Cemetery in his hometown of Winnsboro, South Carolina.

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Esteemed Artillery Order of Molly Pitcher Award Procedures and Requirements

Procedures:

Application for the EAOMP should be submitted at www.fieldartillery.org

A nomination memo must be uploaded to the application. Nomination memo should be signed by a FA 06 Active Army or Marine (FA 05 National Guard where there is no FA BDE in the State) and be addressed to the Commandant of the United States Army Field Artillery School and Chief of the Field Artillery Branch.

The submission should contain a clear description of the significant ways in which the nominated person has contributed to the betterment of our Branch and Service through leadership and mentorship of fellow volunteers.

The USFAA staff will process the award and circulate to the Commandant's office for review and decision.

The approval authority for the Esteemed Artillery Order of Molly Pitcher is the Chief of the Field Artillery. The Chief of the Field Artillery may approve or disapprove the nomination at their discretion.

Requirements:

- Nominee must hold the Artillery Order of Molly Pitcher.
- Nominee or Spouse of the Nominee must be currently serving in the military (Army, Marines, Guard or Reserves) and a member of USFAA in good standing.
- Nominee should have provided significant volunteer service at Brigade, DIVARTY, Regiment level, or higher. For example (but not limited to) advisor or leader of the units Family Readiness Programs or .
- Nominees should have performed significant and identifiable volunteer mentorship and leadership to other FA spouses and/or volunteers who in turn volunteer to serve the Field Artillery community.
- Nominees should have had at least one significant volunteer position at a high level, outside of the Field Artillery, thus sharing the spirit of Molly Pitcher among a broader community. Examples might be (but not limited to)
- Program advisor for special communities such as Gold Star Families, Wounded Warriors and families.
- Representing an installation on local community advisories, such as Governor's or Mayor's councils, or education council for military children.
- Advisor for Installation-wide programs such as Army Community Services, Marine Corps Community Services, American Red Cross, or medical clinic patient council.
- And other higher-level organizations that benefit the Army/Guard/Marine Family at large.

Troop Leading Procedures for the FA Battery

CPT Andrew Agee, CPT Samuel DeJarnett, CPT Sabrina Desper, CPT Lacie Hutchins, CPT Franklin Thompson

A common observation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is poorly conducted or completely neglected Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) in the FA batteries. These deficiencies are due to a lack of understanding, training, and practice of TLP across the FA community. While TLP are a central focus at the Maneuver Center of Excellence's (MCoE) leadership courses, the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) focuses on the technical aspects of fire support, neglecting TLP. Additionally, maneuver formations constantly educate, train and conduct TLP, conversely FA units fail to understand and execute TLP to standard. This paper strives to educate the field artillery community on the importance of TLP and how to best implement them in the FA battery. We will review the eight steps, discuss the importance of early and re-iterative TLP cycles, roles and responsibilities, rehearsals, and identify differences of TLP in the Headquarters Battery (HHB) and Forward Support Company (FSC). Before reviewing the steps, it is important to address the lack of TLP instruction and absence of conducting TLP at home station training. Platoon and battery level leaders should strive to conduct deliberate TLP for all training events, starting with individual training (such as small arms ranges, ASPTs, land navigation, etc.) through collective training events at the battalion and brigade level. FA Battalions and DIVARTYs should consider deliberately educating their batteries on TLP and include evaluating their TLP during tables XII and XV. Acknowledging that FCoE has recently increased the quality and quantity of TLP instruction during BOLC and CCC, we encourage FCoE to continue to evaluate the effectiveness of this instruction and increase opportunities for students to conduct TLP.

TLPs are the Army's tactical planning guide for small units without a staff. Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, describes TLP as "a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation." At the JRTC, battery commanders often fail to utilize TLPs to help plan battery operations. Delayed MDMP at the battalion level typically leads to the

battery commander's hesitation to begin TLP. Additionally, poor time management and the failure lead subordinates to see TLPs as sisyphian tasks. Whether establishing a rearm, refuel, and resupply point (R3P), or occupying a position area for artillery (PAA), the failure to properly conduct TLP has a detrimental effect on mission accomplishment. Below is the eight step TLP process with vital, artillery specific tasks:

STEP I: Receive the mission:

- Understand commander's intent
- Determine specified and implied tasks
- Extract your mission (task, purpose, assigned FATs and fire missions)
- Identify any issues that negatively impact your ability to complete the mission
- Determine additional resources needed (haul capacity, engineer assets)
- Conduct an initial reverse time planning schedule from your IPRTF time

STEP II: Issue a warning order (within 15 minutes):

- Complete Mission Statement
- Task organization
- Initial Timeline
- Special Instructions (Precombat Checks (PCC), precombat inspections (PCI), and rehearsals)
- Service and support (classes I,III,V, maintenance, and medical evacuation)
- Command and Signal (time and place of operations order (OPORD))

STEP III. Make a tentative plan:

- Conduct MA using METT-TC
- Assign PLTs to key/specific tasks
- List subordinate task and coordinating instructions
- Plan for contingencies (alternate PAAs, locations of nearest Role I, dirty vs. clean RTEs, friendly obstacle emplacement)
- Plan routes and include threat assessment
- War-game (BATTERY vs PLT OPS, execution time-

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line and PAAs)

- Conduct tactical risk assessment and mitigation

STEP IV. Initiate movement:

- Must be concurrent while planning is ongoing
- Stage vehicles if practical (refuel, check load plans)
- Ensure classes I, III, and V are 100% of max capacity

STEP V: Conduct reconnaissance:

- Types (ground, air/raven, map, imagery, previous operations)
- Utilize to confirm/validate your tentative plan
- Terrain management (who is enforcing the PAAs assigned by the BCT to the FA BN)

STEP VI: Complete the plan:

- Apply reconnaissance's results and modify plan if necessary
- Create OPORD
- Reconfirm timeline
- Finalize manifest

STEP VII: Issue the order:

- Subordinate leaders attend to include attachments (mechanics, medics, military police, engineers)
- Utilize terrain model, graphics, and target list worksheet
- Have platoon leaders' brief areas they control

STEP VIII: Supervise and refine:

- Confirmation briefs
- Conduct rehearsals (crew drills, CASEVAC, battle drills, R3P procedures)
- Supervise (spot-check) PCC (vehicle and gun maintenance, load plans, and special equipment)
- Utilize pre-formatted checklist for every PCC/PCI

Rotational units at the JRTC regularly fail to maximize available planning time. This often results in an incomplete plan and a lack of shared understanding across the battery. Leaders at the battery level cannot wait until the higher headquarters completes planning to begin their planning. During the "Receive the Mission" step of the troop leading procedures, battery commanders must immediately begin the planning process with all available information and make plan-

ning assumptions as necessary. The planning process should begin as soon as the battery commander has an understanding of mission, commander's intent, and concept of the operation. This may occur prior to the higher headquarters issuing a WARNORD or OPORD. Commanders determine the time available and backward plan the timeline allocating 1/3 of the available time for planning and 2/3 of the available time for subordinates. The battery commander and platoon leaders should always account for time allotted for issuing the OPORD, rehearsals, and PCC/PCI.

To include as much detail as possible into the planning process, the battery commander and platoon leaders execute mission analysis utilizing the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]). This process enables battery leaders to analyze their mission through the lens of METT-TC, make deductions, and identify information gaps. At the JRTC, battery commanders often simply regurgitate the battalion's analysis of the operational variables or provide no level of analysis regarding the battery's mission or specific terrain on which they will operate. Coupling a thorough understanding of the higher headquarters mission, commander's intent, and concept of the operation with the mission analysis process will generate a complete plan for the battery to execute. It is important for leaders to immediately begin planning based on information and time available in order to develop their plan as much as possible.

Battery commanders must know that they are not alone when it comes to planning. Platoon leaders, FDOs, gunnery sergeants, platoon sergeants, executive officers and first sergeants all provide valuable inputs to the order. Platoon leaders are the ideal leaders to help with intelligence preparation of the battle field (IPB). Their responsibilities during RSOP, defense, and selecting hasty and emergency mission locations make terrain and enemy analysis essential to their job. The Battery commander can train and use them to refine BN mission analysis to battery IPB and create paragraph one of the OPORD. Gunnery sergeants can assist platoon leaders and transition from analysis to making the battery scheme of maneuver. Commanders can train gunnery sergeants and platoon leaders

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to select the best firing points in each PAA, refine the convoy composition, and determine final routes to each firing point and potential emergency fire mission locations. This can save time on emplacement and create more understanding of the howitzer sections actions on arrival and threats that the battery will face.

The FDOs must understand battery FATs and their effect on ammunition distribution. As FDOs analyze the TLWS and directed FATs they can determine ammunition distribution and make requests to cover shortages. Similar to maneuver units, First Sergeant should own the scheme of medical support and chemical decontamination. First Sergeant's understanding of adjacent units' and higher units' medical support will save lives if they can understand and communicate the best routes to and from the closest and dirty ROLEI/II. The executive officer can assist first sergeant in this and all aspects of support operations.

The XO and First Sergeant need to own the concept of sustainment. Not just track numbers, but formulate the plan with the commander of when and who conducts resupply missions. They are also key for formulating the commander's CCIR and PIR. As both of them should have a large role in the BOC, they are a good resource to help a commander form PIR and CCIR in order to make informed decisions quickly. Platoon sergeants can ensure Soldiers are prepared for the mission. Platoon sergeants often neglect packing lists, PCCs, PCIs, and executing rehearsals. The platoon sergeant is the ideal person to ensure that section chiefs prepare their equipment, and Soldiers practice key drills they will execute in the mission. It may seem overwhelming to continuously conduct rehearsals, however there are several types of rehearsals and they do not all need to be full dress rehearsals. The types of rehearsals are Network, Map, Sketch Map, Digital Terrain Model, Key Leader, and Full Dress (FM 6-0).

Rehearsals of the Concept (ROC) Drills would benefit the BTRY with each change in phase of the operation. Along with the ROC Drills, the BTRYs must prioritize the Special Teams RXLs (i.e. Aid and Litter), the CASEVAC/MEDEVAC plan, and Small arms tactics (React to forms of contact) for each phase and every time the BTRY or adjacent units may

move. Several factors change as units move around the battlefield. Examples include: the locations of the nearest Role 1 level of care, enemy obstacles and "dirty" routes, the biggest enemy threat to the BTRY (IDF, "Red Air", Special Purpose Forces).

The casualty care and evacuation plan must be rehearsed from point of injury to next level of care. Most units rehearse the self-aid, buddy aid, and medics, but fail to rehearse the route to the next level of care or CASEVAC responsibilities. The personnel and vehicles need to be discussed in "succession of command" form.

The BTRYs must also prioritize the sustainment plan as another important rehearsal. Several factors affect the BTRYs' sustainment operations, but at a minimum the BTRY CDR/ISG/XO must communicate with the BN S4 and FSC CMD Team/XO for the plan on resupply operations. If conducting a R3P, the both the BTRY and Distribution PLT will need to discuss link-up procedures and duties/responsibilities prior to arrival at the R3P site.

One of the most important rehearsals for the BTRY is the FA technical rehearsal. The BTRY can conduct this RXL at the BTRY level if BN cannot yet facilitate the RXL. The BTRY will have an AOF or at least know the maneuvers' objectives even if they do not necessarily have a TLWS yet. At the BTRY level the FDCs will be more successful if they proactively rehearse potential targets and ensure that they have the proper ammunition on hand to support the upcoming phase of the operation. For example, going into a defensive operation the M777A2 BTRY can assume they will need RAAM-S or RAAM-L for FASCAM targets. The M119A3 BTRYs can assume they will need DPICM which a lot of units overlook the minimum range and mis-position the BTRY to support those targets.

For the battery to be most successful, it must conduct rehearsals (RXLs) consistently and thoroughly. The decisive action environment is ever changing and therefore the rehearsals must be continuous.

Another common observation at the JRTC is that HHB leaders struggle even more than firing batteries to understand the importance of TLP for their elements. HHB commanders often express the view that they do not

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tactically own or control any subordinate units directly, and therefore TLP are redundant to battalion level planning for elements such as radars, battalion aid station (BAS), or command posts (CPs). This view is flawed in that it assumes battalion has the ability or time to plan and rehearse the same level of detail that is accomplished through TLP. HHB commanders, 1SGs, and XOs should work with their Target Acquisition (TA) leaders, Medical Officer (MEDO) and Platoon Sergeant, Operations NCO, Master Gunner, and battalion planners and leaders to deliberately plan, at a minimum, the movements, security, and logistical support to radars, BAS, and CPs. The HHB command team will likely need to coordinate with the FSC command team to corroboratively plan for the CTCP, or clearly delineate duties and responsibilities for the CTCP between the HHB and FSC.

It is just as important for FSCs to conduct TLP as it is for the firing batteries and HHB. Per ATP 3-9.23 “The forward support company commander should be involved in the planning process to assist the S-4 in determining logistics requirements and integrating the concept of sustainment into the tactical plan. The forward support company commander knows best how to employ the forward support company in support of the tactical plan.” An observation at the JRTC is the FSC commander is not involved during MDMP which typically results the lack of a sustainable concept of support. Such as, firing batteries execute off the field artillery synch matrix (FASM)

and the Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP) and the FSC supports their battalion by utilizing the sustainment synch matrix. Within the FSC, TLP need to be a deliberate process to ensure they operationalize the plan and support both the battalion and required company level tasks. The FSC typically lacks the utilization of TLP which prevent them from effectively prioritizing tasks and correctly delineating responsibilities effectively throughout the company. It is imperative that all personnel within the FSC understand their roles and responsibilities which enables shared understanding. The FSC and its subordinate elements, including the distribution platoon, maintenance section, CTCP and FTCP, can conduct TLP in a similar manner to HHB.

In conclusion, the JRTC has observed that FA batteries and their FSCs struggle to conduct Troop Leading Procedures and therefore struggle to plan, synchronize and rehearse battery operations. We believe this issue is due to a lack of education, training, and practice of TLP prior to units arriving at the JRTC. Through deliberate education and training of units and leaders on TLP, and an evaluation of platoon and battery TLP during tables XII and XV, the FA community can increase its ability to effectively plan, synchronize, and execute battery and below operations.

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SINET

MILPER MESSAGE 21-285, SERGEANT MAJOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (SMAP) - BaATTENDANCE IAW THE FISCAL YEAR 2021 (FY21) COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR (CSM)/ SERGEANT MAJOR (SGM) EVALUATION BOARD, ISSUED: [8/4/2021 7:35:31 AM]. Selection for BDE CSM positions is one of the most important decisions the Army makes. CSMs at this level are critical to the accomplishment of the Army's mission. Further, these CSMs play a crucial role in the retention of our finest Soldiers. For these reasons, the Army must select the very best from its ranks for these critical roles. Therefore, The SMA is incorporating an additional step to the CSM/SGM Slating process, the Sergeant Major Assessment Program (SMAP). All Brigade-level candidates (those holding PDPC 6C or 6P) will report to Fort Knox for a formal assessment prior to finalizing the CSM/SGM slate, as outlined in the body of this message. <https://www.hrc.army.mil/Milper/21-285>

The ALx Bulletin

PODCAST: The Spear - “Finding Balance” – Have you ever struggled with balancing work requirements and difficult personal challenges? This podcast interviews a Soldier who wrestled with platoon leadership and a serious family illness while deployed – it offers lessons on personal well-being for those struggling and for leaders trying to help the Soldiers in their care. Also available on Apple podcasts.

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2021/Masaracchia-Project-Athena/>

Risking our Battalion Aid Station to Save our Artillerymen

These past 19 years of conflict during the Global War on Terrorism has resulted in unrealistic medical evacuation expectations for future conflicts. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 (06-25 October 1973) saw an estimated 7,500 wounded Israeli casualties, 21,000 wounded Syrians, and 30,000 wounded Egyptians in 19 days as the combined arms conflict illustrated the deadly, casualty-producing results of artillery and air defense (Los Angeles Times, 1991). Large scale combat operations (LSCO) with near-peer or peer-to-peer adversaries will place a large strain on our medical support operations. The increased casualty rates, large casualty densities, and the lack of air superiority will require Role 1 medical treatment facilities to be positioned in the most advantageous locations to provide the timely medical care needed to preserve the unit's fighting strength. Field Artillery (FA) units face a unique challenge in caring for multiple "urgent" casualties during LSCO due to the artillery and counterfire threat that they face. Commanders must position their Battalion Aid Stations (BAS) as far forward as tactically possible if they are to effectively triage casualties, provide urgent care, or enable onward movement to a higher role of care – all while mitigating risk to the mission.

FA units training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) assume little risk when considering the placement of their medical platoon and BAS. In my two years as an Observer, Controller/Trainer (OC/T) at JMRC, all but two units have co-located their BAS with the combat trains command post (CTCP). A CTCP co-location generally provides little to no benefit to the medical concept of support (MEDCOS), due to their position in the battlefield, reduced support from battalion, and relative distance from the firing batteries. This proximity to the brigade support area (BSA) provides much logistical support for the Forward Support Company (FSC), but it places the BAS too close to the Role II to provide any meaningful medical support to the forward batteries. Logistical support can be provided to these batteries with little difficulty, but the firing batteries often find themselves

proximal to other, non-organic, aid stations. These FA BASs find themselves treating less than 12% of their battalion's casualties. Positioning the BAS with the battalion (BN) tactical operations center (TOC), however, is often a more suitable location. This is geographically closer to the firing batteries, has better communications with subordinate batteries and higher echelons, and benefits from the same level of security. The BASs that co-located with the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB) treated at least 83% of their battalion's casualties due to their improved MEDCOS.

"I do not have to tell you who won the war. You know our artillery did." – GEN Patton
Table 7-6 of Army Training Publication (ATP) 3-09.23, "Field Artillery Cannon Battalion," shows an example of how a CTCP could be configured based on various factors. This example includes the BAS at the CTCP and it is this inclusion that leads many to accept it as the doctrinal option for BAS occupation. This table is merely an example and doctrine provides commanders with much needed flexibility. Artillery firing batteries win wars, but it is the BAS that conserves the FA battalion's fighting strength. In order to do so, FA BNs must stop defaulting to the CTCP as the BAS location and BN Medical Operations Officers (MEDOs) must be leveraged as the force enablers that they are. BN MEDOs possess the doctrinal knowledge and expert medical analysis to help shape the FA BNs MEDCOS.

Much in the same way that tactical fire direction can be either centralized or decentralized, so too can the medical concept of support. From a battalion perspective, a centralized MEDCOS is achieved at the TOC whereas a decentralized MEDCOS is at the CTCP. This is due to the heavy BN staff support available from the TOC and the BAS's direct access to the tactical commander. A MEDO operating from the CTCP must adhere to the principles of conformity, proximity, continuity, and flexibility with any effective MEDCOS – an issue many rotational MEDOs

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have faced at JMRC. Before the first fire mission is processed, a MEDO at the CTCP may already be at a disadvantage on account of their location within the battlespace providing little benefit to the firing batteries and the reduced BN support from being geographically displaced from the TOC. Co-locating the BAS with the TOC allows the MEDO to exercise control with maximum responsiveness and speed of execution in their doctrinal responsibility to provide Army Health System (AHS) support to the FA BN.

This isn't to say that placing your BAS at the CTCP will equate to failure in the medical mission. On the contrary, the situation on the battlefield may indicate that the CTCP is, in fact, the ideal location for the BAS. This, however, should be a decision made based on the tactical environment, the mission, the medical common operational picture (MEDCOP), and anticipated medical support requirements. BAS placement is a decision made by the combatant commander, in conjunction with the BN MEDO, to provide the most effective medical support to the battalion's artillerymen. This decentralized location requires a competent, knowledgeable, and trusted MEDO as it is difficult to achieve medical synchronization across the battalion, particularly when commanders are still vying for centralized control.

In order to effectively execute an efficient AHS support plan, BN MEDOs must be synchronized with the Fire Support (FS) plan – this starts with inclusion in the military decision-making process (MDMP). The MDMP is where the FA battalion integrates the battalion's planning process with that of the brigade's. By including the MEDO, the medical team gains the knowledge of pertinent information such as running estimates, time analysis, constraints/restrictions, and facts/assumptions. The MEDO can provide suggested BAS locations during course of action (COA) development that enables the BAS to be placed within supporting distance (specifically to high casualty areas), in relative safety, and without obstructing the tactical mission. Different phases of the operation may require the BAS to jump locations to continue providing the most effective support.

During the COA development of the MDMP, FA battalions plan D3A (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) methods for FA tasks to include triggers while inte-

grating these triggers with higher echelon COAs (per ATP 3-09.23). This level of detail does not go into the medical planning process at the BN level, however. If FA BN commanders are not willing to assume the risk in decentralized control of their BAS placements, FA BNs should consider the triggers that would result in moving the BAS to better facilitate the MEDCOS. For example, placing the BAS at the CTCP will provide little benefit to the BN in most situations (as it would be too far to the rear). If a firing battery is expected to take increased casualties (or has taken increased casualties), will relocating your BAS to an advantageous position be tactically feasible? If your radar deployment order places your radar teams in inadvertently austere locations, without internal medical support, is there an identified location to relocate your BAS to provide the ability to also conduct medical evacuation and treatment for these personnel? The tactical situation remains fluid and the MDMP should identify alternate locations for the BAS that can best contribute to the overall AHS support plan within the FA battalion.

Co-locating the BAS with the TOC is generally the more ideal location within a field artillery battalion. This location is mutually beneficial. On one hand, the BAS is geographically closer to the firing batteries (and often brigade), thus reducing evacuation times. Battery-level casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) is improved by this reduced time/distance, and the BAS has an increased ability to push their medical evacuation platforms forward to collect casualties (or assist, such as in the event of a mass casualty situation). By being closer to the firing batteries, the BAS is capable of directly treating more of their own casualties. This allows the MEDO to better manage, plan, and coordinate force health protection assets throughout the battalion. This is also particularly beneficial to the medical platoon as it provides the medical platoon leadership additional face time with the battery medics during casualty transfers. This is an opportunity for the medical leadership to resupply class VIII medical supplies (via speedballs or custom ordered lists), provide guidance and mentorship, and relay or gather impor-

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tant information (a process that is even more beneficial during times of degraded communications). On the other hand, the HHB benefits from this situation by having their medical treatment facility proximal to the BN TOC – a location that is often considered a target area for opposing forces. This places the BAS near the area of expected casualties. This location at the BN TOC also places the BAS closer to a wider range of communication assets and ability to maintain communications between the BAS, BN TOC, and the firing batteries has been the differentiator between having an effective medical asset and an unreliable medical section.

Little to no adjustments need to be made to the overall security plan – either at the BN TOC or at the CTCP. The medical platoon is rarely included into the base defense plan thereby eliminating any adjustments in that area. Planning must be made, however, to provide medical support to the area not being co-located. This is considerably easier for the CTCP when the BAS is at the TOC. The CTCP is generally safer than the TOC on account of its location, has less risk of enemy attack, and will require less overall medical support. Their proximity to the BSA and the Role II also enables direct medical support from that location. The FSC also has a large vehicle fleet with a larger casualty load capacity. This makes their CA-SEVAC plan far easier to plan than that of the HHB. This does place your BAS at a greater risk of attack, damage, or capture. This can be mitigated by a proper base defense plan but is also a decision that the tactical commander must consider: do we place our Battalion Aid Station in increased danger to provide the most effective medical care for our artillerymen?

How do we reduce the risk aversion that is so prominent in our FA battalions as it pertains to our BAS site selection? This starts with changing the way we visualize the next conflict America may face.

Former Surgeon General of the Army and commander of Army Medical Command Lieutenant General Nadja West once stated “a Soldier with a head wound in Afghanistan could arrive from the point of injury to Bethesda Naval Medical Center where the medical specialist was standing by within 24 hours of being wounded” (Vergun, 2016). This is no longer the case. In today’s day and age of advanced/ advancing

enemies, artillerymen and artillerywomen are more susceptible to artillery and retaliating counterfire than ever before. As counterfire results in mass casualty (MASCAL) situations, line medics with their finite amount of Class VIII between their aid bag and the units’ combat lifesaver (CLS) bags, casualties can be expected to still be at their organic BAS 24-hours after point of injury. The expectation is to have stressed evacuation channels and no air assets available during these conflicts, increasing the necessity for far-forward medical care.

Nearly 20 years of air superiority is coming to an end. What we will face in future near-peer or peer-to-peer conflicts in LSCO – particularly as it applies to FA BNs facing counterfires – is a lethal, high casualty-producing fight. Soldiers will die. Cannons and Howitzers will be lost, as will their crew. The human toll of a war with Russia, China, or any near peer will be high. Minor examples of this can be seen in the Yom Kippur War, the Korean War, and throughout World War II. Military tactics have evolved and so has the weaponry of our enemies. Combatant commanders and medical planners must position their medical assets in the most tactically feasible and medically advantageous locations. Field Artillery Battalion commanders must not shy from the risk of losing medical assets. Only by doing so, can the field artillery battalion aid station provide the most medical care to save the lives of your artillerymen.

FA Home Station Training/ Preparation for LSCO BAS Placement

- MDMP/ Command Awareness for Medical assets (PSG and MEDO) – begin building repetitions by having the MEDO present and involved during MDMP. As the commander and MEDO work together, they increase trust and cohesion.
- CLS/ TCCC-AC training – Medical personnel need assistance, particularly during LSCO and especially during MASCAL. Training your artillerymen in CLS and TCCC-AC will help ensure that everyone has access to immediate lifesaving interventions, regardless

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of their location on the battlefield.

- Medic Class VIII/ Pharmacology training with Unit Provider – LSCO, the delayed evacuation times, and the move towards prolonged field care will result in a large emphasis in pharmacology. Set your medical platoon up for success by ensuring they are trained and facilitate training time for the provider to conduct training.
- Role I set-up (CTCP and BN TOC) with Command walk-through– Home station training is paramount to rotation training and operational success. Train to establish your BAS at both CTCP and BN TOC locations to learn how to best synchronize. Include command walk-throughs at both locations to educate, receive guidance, and demonstrate spatial awareness.
- Casualty Collection Point (CCP), set-up and rehearsals – CCPs save lives. Train to establish and operate a CCP, for they are the bridge between your point-of-injury care and the BAS. Include a CCP at each location, for every field training event, and ensure that all artillerymen understand their importance.
- Communication/ COMSEC change-over rehearsals – Communication poses an issue, regardless of location. The CTCP and BN TOC have different levels of support, equipment, and obstacles. Learn to be familiar with each location during set-up drills and develop plans to mitigate forecasted issues/concerns.
- PACE plan for 9-line rehearsals with CTCP and/or BN TOC – Develop a medical PACE plan for your BN at each location and identify personnel/sections that can assist the medical platoon in receiving/sending information throughout the battlespace.
- MASCAL crawl/ walk/ run rehearsals with all factors (CLS, S-1, S-2, S-4, CMD Team) – Whether at the BN TOC or the CTCP, conduct a full MASCAL rehearsal and then rehearse it again.

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the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. He has previously served as a platoon sergeant and S3 Plans/Operations NCO in 1st Medical Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas and as a battery senior medic with 2-1 Air Defense Artillery, Kunsan Air Base, Korea. He has deployed twice in support of Operation Enduring Freedom as a platoon medic with the 36th Engineer Brigade.

Sgt Quentin A. Mendez is a Healthcare Specialist (68W) in the U.S. Army. He is currently assigned to the 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment out of Tower Barracks, Grafenwohr, Germany. Sgt Mendez has conducted rotations through JMRC with 4-319th and has assisted as a guest OC/T.



Bonus rounds at JMRC





Coaching Points:


- Bonus rounds are a finite resource
- Adheres to "Convention on Cluster Munitions" and is ballistically similar to the M864 BB DPICM
- Employed for specific fire support tasks and effects
- **Considerations:**
 - Targets set is heavy armored vehicles (MBTs, IFVs and SP howitzers)
 - Types of Terrain
 - Moving Targets < 30 km/h
 - Range 7.8-27.6 km
 - Required TLE ≤ CAT IV (31 - 91m)
 - 41 sec after the 2nd Expulsion submunitions will detonate if it does not detect a target
 - 5 km EFP Fragmentation and EFP Hazard Distance around the target
 - Without specified sheaf AFATDS sheafing logic will create a high concentration of submunitions
- Mission Analysis and Wargaming steps are important to understand risks of employment
- Effective employment will have greater effects on HPTs and degrade counterfire threat

Rotational UBL:

- Due to limited quantities in theater the rotational training unit begins with no more than 1% of their UBL allocated to Bonus rounds
 - CSR (3rds/tube/day) controls resupply
- Realistic start point within Skolkan rotational Road to War - 215 days from onset of hostilities
- 1% is approximately 18 rounds per UBL
 - 18 x 2S19 or 18 x destruction missions against tanks



155MM Bonus rounds Mk 2 Flight Phases



FIRE SUPPORT; FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE SUPPORT

SFC Stimmell, Joshua D

13F Soldiers are a diminishing return.

The fire support Soldier was once the largest combat multiplier to any maneuver force. Fire support bound the enemy to the anvil while the maneuver brought the hammer. An asset that was always a welcome part of the team, professional and proficient in all indirect fires tools. Fast forward to present day. The artillery and fire support has suffered a detrimental deterioration of skills from almost two decades of non-typical roles and responsibilities in a COIN centric fight. Colonels Sean McFarland, Michael Shields, and Jeffery Snow identified this in “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s ability to provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders”. The CTCs have long reported a lack of competent support. This has fractured the relationship of the Field Artillery, and the Maneuver, leaving Fire Support caught in the middle, trying to appeal to both parents, showing that we are relevant, competent, and capable.

“The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis”, -- A German General Officer. Non-standard is the standard. This diminishes the role of fire support in large-scale ground combat operations. There is no set standard for how we produce products or the order in which they are even produced. If we, the home of the Field Artillery do not produce it, how can we expect Brigade Combat Teams themselves to create something that works across the Army. We fail at the ability to be “plug and play”, which only creates more havoc and chaos when fire support planning with adjacent units.

One example of this is “Operation Dragon Spear” the CSA Exercise 2015 conducted at the National Training Center. The 18th Airborne Corps Fires Cell worked with two different FA Brigades, 2nd BDE 82nd ABN, 2nd BN 75th Ranger Regiment, a portion of 10th SFG, and 2ID. One of the first, and main issues identified were that no two units used the same products or procedures; not in planning nor in products. This affected planning and the entire process of integrating fires into the maneuver plan. Man

hours are lost bringing everyone to the same standard and ensuring everyone understands the final product. “Israel’s years of COIN-focused operations in the occupied territories cost them dearly in South Lebanon. When the IDF attempted to return to HIC operations, it found itself unable to effectively plan fires, conduct terminal control, or de-conflict airspace.”

A very ready solution to this dilemma is by standardizing a minimum product. It increases interoperability with other units across the Army, as well as from a Joint Fires perspective. The standard forms we do have are, as we speak, modified by units at this moment. However, if we have baseline standardized documents, any fire supporter can pick up these documents and know the minimum of what they are looking at. They can interoperate with another unit without explanation. However saying “Format of and information in FSEMs will vary from unit to unit”, will continue to provide hindrance to fire supporters.

Standard Documents include;

- DA 4655-R Target List Worksheet

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“The speed, accuracy and devastating power of American Artillery won the confidence and admiration from the troops it supported and inspired fear and respect in their enemy.”

-Dwight D. Eisenhower

- DA 4656 Scheduling Worksheet
- DA 2185 Shelling Report
- DA 5429 Conduct of Fire
- DA 5032 Field Artillery Delivered Minefield Planning Sheet

Products that subject to vary based on unit and opinion;

- High Payoff Target List
- Fire Support Execution Matrix
- Target Selection Standards
- Target Sync Matrix
- Attack Guidance Matrix

“Leadership is solving problems. The day Soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you stopped leading them” -Gen. Colin L. Powell.

Maneuver commanders have generally stopped counting on fire support from the Field Artillery. Close Air Support and Army Attack Aviation has won their confidence. Fire support products are an intricate part of execution, while over half of the products any Fire Support Element (FSE) will use are non-standard. This begs the question. Who is responsible for what? There are several pages in the ATP 3-09.42 that lay out how fire support aligns with the Military Decision Making Process. An Infantry Brigade Combat Team FSE has a Fire Support Officer, and two Assistant Fire Support Officers. In a perfect case scenario one is working in Current Operations, while the other works in Future Operations. There is one Fire Support NCO (FSNCO). While the doctrine supports that the FSNCO's only input into the fire support planning process is as an enlisted assistant to the Brigade FSO. There is a misconception that the FSNCO is next in the succession of fire support. We, the fire support community lack a tremendous amount of guidance in our roles. This is a trend that has been perpetuated through multiple Combat Training Center (CTC) reports. Additionally, doctrinally, from the perspective of the ma-

neuver commander, or from an evaluation standpoint at the CTCs, there is a clear misunderstanding of who is responsible for what, and what each person brings to the table. Under doctrine, that FSNCO does not even have ownership of the certification program. He or she is simply tracking and managing a flow of updated information to the subordinate units. The lion's share of the fire support work doctrinally, is owned by the Officers, and Warrant Officers.

Knowing who owns the work required is only one part of the problem. Based on unit preference, what role the FSNCO plays can vary greatly. We need to clearly spell out the roles and responsibilities of the different duty positions at all echelons. Far too many times you end up with FSNCOs trying to fill the role of the FSO. This is a side effect of an expectation from the maneuver commander. A FSNCO may be expected to train an FSO on “how this unit works”, while there is no doctrine to support that. The old adage that a FSNCO is the replacement for an FSO is completely WRONG. The only echelon in which doctrine supports the FSNCO being a replacing a FSO is at the Company level. An example from the National Training Center;

14Sept2020 NTC Observations, Discussion, and Recommendation;

Observation: Task Force FSNCOS fail a majority of the time to know their duties and responsibilities. This creates a negative outcome for the unit if **they can't be relied upon.**

Discussion: At the National Training Center, the FSNCO often takes the role of the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Operator, or the fires radio telephone operator (RTO). The reason for this is that the FSNCO is not knowledgeable

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Fire Support ...continued from Page 28

in their duties and responsibilities, and the requirements needed from them. This stems from them not understanding that they are the FSO's teammate and they should be involved with everything involving fires in support of the maneuver during operations and planning. Also, most units do not have an established standard operating procedure for fires that goes into detail on the duties and responsibilities of everyone in the fires cell.

Recommendation: Units should establish an SOP laying out the expectations of the FSNCO. The FSO must be clear in their guidance and keep the FSNCO informed of the current operations. This will allow the FSNCO to give their input and bring something of value to the team. FSNCOs deficient in the knowledge of Army doctrine can educate themselves by reading the FM 3-09, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations and ATP 3-09.30 Observed Fires, which lists the duties of the position. If units, FSOs, and the FSNCOs accomplish these three things, FSNCO and fires outcomes will improve at NTC.

**From the perspective of FM 3-09 referencing the Fire Support NCO duties. This FSNCO is not only being critiqued on his duties as the FSNCO, but also the Operations NCO. This is just a single example of a lack of knowledge across the Army of what is expected from a FSNCO.*


“Renown awaits the Commander who first restores the artillery to its prime importance on the

battlefield” -Winston Churchill. We have an opportunity to show the maneuver commanders that they can count on us. Time and training to a standard will prevail every time over making it up as you go. Define our roles and responsibilities identifying a standard product; eliminating wasted time, effort and confusion. We first educate ourselves, and then we educate those that we support, providing them a skillset to fight and win, anywhere and at any time. Joseph Stalin once said, “Artillery is the God of war”, and that remains true today.

Large-scale ground combat operations will always involve a Soldier on the ground, making an advancement on the enemy. The choice is ours; we can choose to be a detriment or be a combat multiplier to that ground force. From today until man does not exist on earth any longer, wars will always be fought on the ground resulting in close combat. Maneuver units will fight to own the ground and all other forces will support maneuver in their mission to gain and maintain control of the ground.

In all past major wars the Field Artillery has inflicted the most casualties, with that in mind it is vital that we, the Field Artillery support the maneuver forces with relevant, competent and well diverse fire supporters who have been trained on a standard doctrine using standard fire support forms and products to help expedite the delivery of fires in support of the maneuver forces who either own, or are fighting to own the ground in which the battles will be fought as we bridge that gap of confidence with the maneuver forces showing them that the Field Artillery is back in the close fight.

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ASK Airborne Preference



- “Airborne Duty Preference” goes live in ASK at 0800 on 17 August 2021
- All old/legacy airborne preference ASCO (V5 and D8) will be cleared at 0800 on 17 August 2021
- Soldiers will receive a new ASCO based on their response in the “Airborne Duty Preference” section in ASK (See screenshot to the right)
- ASK will only allow selection of one airborne preference
- Soldier is required to make an airborne preference before ASK preferences will save (Error message pops up if Soldier attempts to save without selecting an airborne preference)
- Date will populate in Airborne Preference Section each time the Soldier updates their preference
- HRC and Field can query ASCO’s to determine airborne duty preference
- **Way Forward:**
 - Update ASK-EM messaging prior to 22-04 IOT instruct potential movers to update their airborne preference prior to the market
 - Update slating rules to consider airborne preference
 - ICW 18th ABC, publish an EXORD to instruct all Soldiers to make an airborne preference (Supports Airborne PAI)

Airborne Duty Preference (Select the ONE option that best represents your preference)

(Failure to enter an Airborne preference or update every 3 years will result in your Airborne preference defaulting to 'Decline Airborne' and SQI removal may be considered by HRC)

DATE Airborne Preference Last updated:

Airborne Volunteer

("I want to move to an airborne assignment AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. If not currently airborne qualified, I am willing to volunteer to attend airborne training and accept an airborne assignment.")

Airborne Duty Preferred

("I am willing to accept and prefer an airborne assignment during my next SCHEDULED move. If not airborne qualified, I am willing to volunteer to attend airborne training.")

Non-Airborne Duty Preferred

("I am willing to go to an airborne assignment in the future, but prefer non-airborne for my next move. I understand this is only a PREFERENCE and I may be directed if required to meet Army readiness needs.")

Decline Airborne

("I do not want to be considered for an airborne assignment now or in the future because I am unwilling or medically unable to accept an airborne assignment.")

(Removal of SQI may be initiated)

ASCEM requires Internet Explorer with Javascript enabled to work correctly.

Your Year Month Available (YMAV) is [202007]. If you have any questions, contact your career branch team.

Home Contact Preferences/Volunteer On Assignment Background PDL ASK-EM Log Out

Please be advised, Market 19070-20-01 will close in 12 days. If you have not already submitted your preferences

Assignment Satisfaction

Assignment Preference

An Assignment Preference indicates that you are interested in an assignment. Your order of selections does not indicate a list of only rotational assignments; the requirements.

CONUS

FORT CAMPBELL, KY FORT DRUM, NY FORT KNOX, KY

Airborne Duty Preference

Please choose an Airborne option prior to saving!

Ok